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1. INTRODUCTION 
Baik and Shogren ( 1992b) examine the efficiency characceristics of a contest between two 
unequall y matched players competing over a fi xed reward. By allowing irreversible and observable 
strategic commitment of effort , Baik and Shogren find that both players undercommic effo rt in 
equilibrium relative to the traditional simultaneous move Nash game. The player with the lesser 
influence over the probability of winning, or the underdog, finds it advantageous to take the fi rst 
punch and move first. The player with the greater influence over the probability of winning, or the 
favorite, finds it advantageous to move second. An important impl ication of this equilibrium order 
of play is lower soc ial costs. The underdog leader subgame entails the lowest rate of rent diss ipation 
in any of the three possible subgames, decreasing the cost to society from the confl ict. 
The objective of this thesis is to test the predictive power of Baik and Shogren's (1992b) 
endogenous timing theory in an experimental setting. We will analyze actual verses predicted effort 
levels, rent dissipation. and timing choices. Few experiments have researched the interaction between 
unequall y matched opponents, subsequentl y results will dictate directions fo r future research. 
Actual fi ndings do not support 1.he pred ictions of Baik and Shogren's model of endogenous 
timing. Instead. results support the theo ry that underdogs place more value on the potential gain than 
do the favo rites. Experimental results suggest that the underdogs may value the gain more than two 
times as much as the favorites. The higher valuation of the gain by the underdogs leads to greater 
rent dissipation than predicted by symmetric valuation and a greater social cost. 
The thes is proceeds as fo llows. Section 2 develops the analytical framework for strateg ic 
behavior between favo rites and underdogs. Section 3 discusses the bas is fo r experimental 
economics, develops the experimental design used to test endogenous timing theory, and summarizes 
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the results. Section 4 examines three possible explanations for the observed behavior. Finally. 
section 5 co ntains concluding remarks and directions fo r future research . 
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2. THEORETICAL BASIS 
2. l General Background 
Contest theory is the study of the competition between agents to gain a prize. Dixie ( 1987) 
explains that many economic and social games are contests where agents exert effort in order to 
increase their probability of winning a prize. Dixit includes examples such as (i) research and 
development rivalry for an innovation; (i i) bribery competition to secure a contract from the 
government; and (iii) sporting contests such as the Wimbledon final or the Superbowl. 
Contest theory has been studied in terms of research and development rivalry (Dasgupta and 
Stiglitz 1980), monopoly rent seeking (Tullock 1980). and from the viewpoint of incentive design 
(Nalebuff and Stiglitz 1983). In the case of rent seeking, as studied in industrial organization. the 
prize is associated with monopoly profit due to market power. The agents in this case are potemial 
monopolists spending money in hopes of securing a monopoly position and capturing the monopoly 
profit or rent. An important aspect of the study of rent seeking is the concept of rent dissipation. 
Rent dissipation is the total expenditure by agents to obtain the rent. The theory is that the monopoly 
profit may only be part of the welfare loss associated with rent-seeking. The effort or expenditure 
exerted in attempting to gain the rent may be an additional deadweight loss to society (Tullock 1980). 
Traditionally, monopoly pricing has been considered inefficient for society because marginal 
cost is equated with marginal revenue in equilibrium instead of with the market price as in the case 
of perfect competition. Rent seeking and rent diss ipation address the additional loss to society created 
by the competition for the monopoly rent. Competition such as bribing government officials in the 
hopes of capturing a government contract or retaining attorneys in the hopes of getting a parent to 
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ensure monopoly rent is considered a directl y unproductive activity. This competition does not 
directl y benefit society. The idea of "efficient rent seeking" as fo rwarded by Tullock (1980) 
considers the cost to society created by the rent seeking activity. As Tullock points out , many 
theoretical studies of rent seeking activity fi nd that agents seeking to capture monopoly rent will 
collectively spend more money to capture the rent than the actual value of the rent1• The rent 
dissipation percentage is a yardstick that measures the ineffici ency of the rent seeking activity. If the 
total effort exerted to capture the rent is equal to the total value of the rent, rent dissipation is 100 
percent. 
Experimental studies of contest theory have researched th.e extent to which agents in an 
experimental market fo llow theoretical pred ictions in terms of observed behavior and rent dissipation. 
Millner and Pratt (1989) tested two versions of Tullock's (1980) model of efficient rent seeking . In 
both vers ions of Tullock' s model, agents simultaneously selected effo rt levels to influence th e 
probability of winning a reward. Millner and Pratt (1989) found that experimental participants 
dissipated more than predicted with both versions of the model. Further study of the Millner and 
Pratt experiment by Shogren and Baik revealed that one of the versions of Tut lock's model tested by 
Millner and Pratt (1989) did not have a Nash equilibrium. Shogren and Baik (1991) redesigned the 
experiment and found participant behavior consistent with pred icted rent seeking and dissipation. The 
experiment examined simultaneous move Nash behavior between two pl.ayers in a symmetri c game. 
Shogren and Baik (1992) later tested Dixit 's (1987) model of strategic behavior in experimental 
contests between unequally matched opponents involving Stackelberg leadership. Shogren and Baik 
(1992) found only parti al support fo r theoretical predictions of Dixit's model. 
In these experiments and throughout experimental economics, researchers must select spec ific 
versions of general models to test theoretical pred ictions. The belief is that fo r a theory to be 
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applicable to the very complicated economies found in nature, it must hold fo r specific cases. To 
quote Plott (1991) "Models that do not apply to the simple special cases are not general and thus 
cannot be viewed as such. "2 In this thesis. we will test a specific version of Baik and Shogren's 
(1992b) endogenous timing model. 
2.2 Endogenous Timing 
To test endogenous timing requires choosing a spec ific parameterization of the general 
theoretical model. The general model proposed by Baik and Shogren (l992b) consist of two 
unequally matched players competing fo r a fixed prize. Each player can increase his or her 
probability of winning the prize by expending more effort. Define the favorite as the player with 
greater than a one-half chance of winning at the Nash equilibrium and the underdog as the player with 
less than a one-half chance. Dixit (1987) found that if the favorite moves first , he or she will 
overcommit effort relative to the Nash equilibrium, leading to greater social costs. If the underdog 
moves first, he or she undercommits relative to the Nash equilibrium leading to smaller social cost. 
Baik and Shogren ( l 992b) demonstrate that, given endogenous order of moves, the favorite will never 
overcommit. The underdog will move first, the favorite will move second. and the rent dissipation 
will be smaller relative to the Nash equilibrium, leading to smaller soc ial cost. Allowing agents to 
choose timing we can decrease the inefficiency caused by competition over a prize. 
The theory of endogenous timing can be applied to institutions that incorporate rent seeking . 
Tullock (1980) explained that the legal system was one institution that closely paralleled rent seeking 
models. Plaintiff and defendant choice between attorneys of differing skill levels would be 
comparable to the selection of effort level. A decision by the court in the favor of a particular party 
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would be equivalent to that party winning the prize or capturing the monopoly rent. Publicly 
announcing counsel would correspond to precommiting effort . Following the argument by Baik and 
Shogren ( 1992b) the underdog in the contest would publicly announce counsel first, the favorite 
second, and the total expenditures on attorney's fees would be reduced relative to the simultaneous 
move case3 . 
To illustrate the findings of Baik and Shogren (1992b) and to set up specific model 
parameters, consider a contest between two risk neutral players , a favorite and an underdog. Players 
are competing to wi n a fixed reward, G. representing the monopoly rent. Players choose effort levels 
which influence the probability of winning the reward . The larger the effort level selected by player 
i, the greater the probability that player i wins the reward and the smaller the probability that player 
j wins the reward . Let player l represent th e favorite and player 2 represent the underdog. The 
probability that player L wins is represented by the following logit function 
( I ) 
where a > l and X; is the observable and irreversible effort level of player i. The probability that 
player 2 wins the reward is represented by 
(2) 
The probability of winning function refl ects the technology of the conflict. Baik and Shogren 
(1992b) employ a more general functional fo rm to demonstrate the theory. Using a specific 
functional form allows for parameterization of th e conflict . A specific functional form also allows 
7 
researchers to quantitatively test the predictive power of a theory in an experimental market . Tullock 
( 1975) introduced the log it function as a probability function in modelling conflict. The logit function 
has been used by Millner and Pratt (1989), and Shogren and Baik (1991 , 1992) to experimentally test 
contest theories. The logit function is especiall y suited fo r experimental research because it generally 
produces manageable equilibrium solutions and it can easily be modified to represent conflicts with 
different technologies. This version of the logit function assumes player l is more powerful in 
influencing the probability of winning. The greater ability to influence the probability of winning for 
a monopolist could be equated with an incumbent advantage or better access to resources. If a = I 
the model collapses to Tullock's (1980) traditional model of a rent seeking contest where players have 
symmetric abil ity. 
In the contest, players l and 2 unilaterally select observable and irreversible effort levels x1 
and x2 to maximize expected returns, 7r1 and 7r2 
Max 1t1 -
x l 
yielding the fo llowing first-order conditions 
cxx1 ----G - x 1 cxx1 + x 2 
__ cx_x_1 --G - 1 - O 
( cxx1 + X2) 2 
(3) 
(4) 
(5) 
(6) 
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and the following second-order sufficient conditions 
2 a. G < 0 for x2 > o 
(7) 
2G < 0 for x1 > o. 
(8) 
Second-order conditions are satisfi ed since expected returns ?rj are strictly concave in xi fo r i = 1,2. 
Reaction functions define the optimal reaction or best response of one player to a choice by the other 
player (see Kreps 1990). Let R;(xj) be the best response of player i to a choice by player j . The 
reaction functions, R1(x:) and Ri{x1), derived from the first-order conditions fo r player l and 2 are 
1 
R2 (xl) - ( a. Gxl ) 2 - <1. Xl 
for O < x 2 ~ a. G 
G for o < x 1 ~ a 
The simultaneous move Nash equilibrium derived from the first order conditions is given by 
(xt , xt) - [ a. G 
(1 + a. ) 2 
a. G l 
(1 + a. ) 2 • 
(9) 
( lO) 
( 11) 
Player 1 is the favorite since he or she has a greater chance of winning at the simultaneous move 
Nash equilibrium . By definition, Nash equilibrium implies that neither player wants to change effort 
level given how he or she believes the other player will react to the change (Kreps 1990). 
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To determine the equilibrium order of play, players decide and announce publicly the periods 
in which they will reveal their effort level. The announcement is simultaneous and perfectly 
enforced. Effort levels are observable and irreversible. Since the game consists of two periods. 
indicating the preference to reveal an effo rt level in the first period is synonymous to choosing to 
lead. Indicating the preference to reveal an effort level in the second period is synonymous to 
choosing to follow. The order of play is determined as follows: if player i chooses to lead and player 
j chooses to fol low, player i announces his or her effort level and player j chooses an effort level with 
the knowledge of player i's choice. If both players choose to lead or both players choose to follow. 
they play the simultaneous move Nash game. For example. if player 1 chooses t0 lead and player 
2 chooses to follow, they will play a Stackelberg leader/fol lower subgame in which player 1 leads 
and player 2 follows. If player I chooses to lead and player 2 chooses to lead the simultaneous move 
Nash subgame will be played. 
To determine player's preferences to lead or fo llow, we compare the expected retu rns in each 
of the three poss ible subgames: the simultaneous move Nash subgame, the Stackelberg favorite leader 
subgame, and the Stackelberg underdog leads subgame. In the favorite leader ubgame. player l 
choo es x1 to maximize expected returns ubject to the player 2' reaction function, R~(x 1 ) 
Max 1t 1 -
X1 
ax1 ----G - X 1 ax1 + x 2 
1 
s. t. x 2 - R2 (x 1 ) - ( a Gx1 ) 
2 - ax1 , 
yielding the fo llowing first and second-order conditions 
( 12) 
10 
- 1 - 0 
( L3) 
a2 FL 1 
1t 1 __ _!_( aG) 2 < O. 
ax; 4 x{ 
(14) 
Using the first-order condition , the Stackelberg equilibrium with the favorite leading is g iven by 
aG (2 -
4 
(15) 
From the Stackelberg favorite leader equilibrium we see that a > 2 would compel player 2 (the 
underdog) to choose a negative effort level. To avoid this outcome we will restrict a to values no 
greater than two. 
The Stackelberg equilibrium in the und erdog leader subgame is determined by the underdog 
selecting x2 to maximize expected returns subject to the favo rite' s reaction function , R1(x,) 
Max 1t2 -
Xz 
yielding the fo llowing first and second-order conditio ns 
(16) 
(17) 
11 
- _ l:_(~) ~ < 0. 
4 <XX2 
(18) 
Using the first-order condition, the Stackelberg equilibrium with the underdog leading is 
given by 
(19) 
In Tullock's (1980) traditional model of rent seeking, et was equal to one. With a equal to one, there 
is no timing preference since each of the three possible subgames yield identical expected returns. 
Figure l and Figure 2 (Appendix A) illustrate favorite and underdog expected returns fo r values of 
et from one to two. The favorite's expected returns are monotonically increasing in et and the 
underdog's expected returns are monotonically decreas ing in et in the relevant range. For the favorite 
and the underdog, larger values of a create incentives to play the underdog leads subgame. The 
result is a timing equilibrium in the underdog leader subgame that is unique and subgame perfect. 
It is unique because there is no other timing equilibrium for these parameters. Subgame perfect 
refers to an overall Nash equil ibrium where every subgame also has a Nash equilibr ium [see Kreps 
( 1990) for a complete treatment of subgame perfection]. 
At a equal to one effort level fo r each player in each subgame is equal to twenty-five percent 
of the gain (G/4), i. e. xt = x tL = X;uL for i = l ,2. In this case there is no favorite and no 
underdog since both players would have a fifty percent chance of winning the prize at the 
simultaneous move Nash equilibrium . But, when a is greater than one player 1 becomes the favorite 
and player 2 becomes the underdog. Figures 3 and 4 (Appendix A) illustrate effort levels for 
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different levels of a for the favorite and underdog. Effort levels for both players decrease in the 
underdog leader subgame when a is greater than one. 
As we can see from the model parameterization, effort level in the conflict between perfectly 
symmetric players playing a perfectl y symmetric game is identical, there is no favorite or underdog 
and no timing preference. But when one player is more productive at influencing the probability, 
strategic commitment becomes advantageous. Intuitively, when a is greater than one, player 1 's 
marginal effectiveness js increased and player 2 's marginal effectiveness is decreased relative to the 
symmetri c case. Th.is creates a first mover advantage for the underdog and a second mover 
advantage for the favorite. Both players will have higher expected returns when the underdog leads. 
The outcome relies on credibility of the underdog's commitment to move first. Endogenous timing 
fo llows Dixit' s ( 1987) assumption of perfectly observable effort such as taking the first swing in a 
fight. Permitting unreliable effort choices would open the door fo r alternate strategies and 
equilibria.4 
To determine the social cost of the conflict we must examine the total amount of effort 
exerted. This is equivalent to looking at the amount of rent diss ipation. Figure 5 (Appendix A) 
graphically illustrates total rent diss ipation for each of the three subgames fo r a E [1,21. As 
discussed, theory predicts that if a > l the endogenous timing equi librium is the underdog leads 
subgame. In the underdog leads subgame, rent diss ipation is less than in the simultaneous move Nash 
subgame and the favorite leads subgame (see Figure 5 in Appendix A). Larger values of a lead to 
even less rent diss ipation. In this case, allowing asymmetric players to choose timing in a contest 
over a fixed prize decreases the total cost to society of the struggle. Both parties exert less effort and 
have higher expected profits by choosing the endogenous timing equilibrium over the conventional 
simultaneous move Nash equilibrium. 
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Implications are that institutions should be designed to al low fo r the choice of timing. The 
legal system is one candidate. Other candidates are: A two party competition over a government 
contract. firms competing for monopoly rent, political campaigns , duopoly price competition. and 
labor disputes . The question we will turn to now is how well do agents' actions match the 
predictions of the theory. 
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3. HYPOTHESIS TESTING IN EXPERIMENTAL MARKETS 
[T]his theory is not speculative in origin; it owes its invention entirely to the desire to make physical 
theory fit observed fact as well as possible ... the justification for a physical concept lies exclusively 
in its clear and unambiguous rel ation to facts that can be experienced - Albert Einstein 
3.1 Why Experimentation? 
The true test of any theory is its ability to predict the environment. Economists often assume 
that since a theory is logically correct, it will predict agent behavior . The study of experimental 
economics has shown that this is not always the case. A common theme that V. L. Smith (1989) has 
seen in experimental economics is that economic agents do not solve decision problems by thinking 
about them and solving them the same way as economists. This does not mean that every economic 
model must perfect! y represent the agent of study, but that models must be evaluated on the basis of 
their predictive and descriptive power. 
Experiments reveal aspects of behavior not predicted by theory . lt can also reveal theoretic 
shortcomings that are not easily observable in natural environments. One such shortcoming that has 
been repeated in a number of experiments is the preference reversal phenomenon. One basic 
assumption of economics is that preferences are independent of the method used to elicit them and 
a well-defined preference ordering ex ists. A poss ible violation of preference ordering assumptions 
was illustrated by Lichtenstein and Slovic (1971). When questioned over gambles with similar 
expected val ues, subjects often placed a higher doll ar value on one bet while stating that they would 
prefer to play another. This finding was replicated by Lichtenstein and Slavic (1973) with real 
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money in a Las Vegas casino and by Grether and Plott (1979). 
Experiments can also chart the path to the rejection of existing theories and the adoption of 
new theories. An example is recent research into the divergence between willingness to pay (WTP) 
and willingness co accept (WTA) measures of value. A consistent divergence between the measures 
was observed in field studies and in laboratory markets. Jack Knetsch (1989) explained the 
divergence by inferring that indifference curves may be nonreversible. Knetsch 's explanation violates 
the assumption that the rate of commodity substitution at a point on an indifference curve is the same 
for movements in either direction. Through a series of second price auctions, Shogren, Shin, Hayes. 
and Kliebenstein (1992), provided strong evidence contrary to Knetsch. They showed that the 
divergence between WTP and WT A can be attributed to the elasticity of substitution between the two 
goods, a theory promoted by Michael Hanemann (199 1). 
Laboratory markets are a simplification of markets fo und in nature. But the simplification 
does not make laboratory markets any less real. As summarized by Plott ( 1991 ), in laboratory 
markets "Real people motivated by real money make real decisions, real mistakes and suffer real 
frustrations and delights because of their real talents and real limitations. Simplicity should not be 
confused with reality. Since the laboratory economies are real, the general principles and models that 
ex ist in the literature should be expected to apply with the same fo rce to these laboratory economies 
as to those economies found in the field. The labo ratories are simple but the simplicity is an 
advantage because it allows the reasons for a model's fa ilure to be isolated and sometimes even 
measured. "j 
The usefulness of experiments is derived from this ab ility to control fo r extraneous variables 
that may be present in the environment. Environmental "noise" can be controlled so that the 
experimenter can clearly determine cause and effect. To quote Alvin E. Roth (1988) "It is precisely 
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this control of environment, and access to the agents (sufficient to observe and measure the attributes 
that are not controlled) that give laboratory experiments their power. "6 This power to control the 
environment is the vehicle for testing theories. 
3.2 Experimenta l Design and Economic Hypothesis 
3.2. l General Experimental Design 
We designed an experiment co test Baik and Shogren 's endogenous timing theory . The 
experiment wa conducted in two treatments. Treatment l was designed to test predicted timing 
choices, equilibrium values , and rent dissipation. Treatment 2 was designed as a test of timing and 
response choices with different incentives and a simpler game structure. 
The experiment was conducted with participants recruited from economics and sociology 
undergraduate course . Thirty-eight students participated in treatment 1 and twenty-six students 
participated in treatment 2. The experiment was carried out in student groups of eight to sixteen. 
Participants were told that they wou ld rece ive a minimum of $4.00 for participating in the experiment 
and possibly more depending on their perfo rmance. Each session lasted for approximately one hour 
and fifteen minutes. Before the start of each experimental sess ion, participants were required to read 
and sign an experimental consent form approved by the Iowa State University Human Subjects 
Committee. Copies of the consent form and experimental instructions fo r both treatments are 
contained in Appendix B. 
Participants were seated in a room one at a time by an experimental monitor. Whether a 
participant was a favorite or an underdog was determined when they were seated . Favorite or 
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underdog status alternated with each participant that entered the room. 7 Each favorite was seated 
facing an oppos ing underdog. As in Millner and Pratt (1989), the experiment consisted of twenty 
trials, one of which was randomly chosen as the binding trial to control for income effects. The first 
two trial s were practice and not binding. After each trial, either the favorites or the underdogs 
rotated one seat so that all participants would play against a different opponent. Even though 
participants played against different opponents every trial , players did not change type, favorites were 
always favori tes and underdogs were underdogs throughout the experiment. There was no time limit 
for any trial . 
There were two stages in each trial . In stage one, participants selected the timing for stage 
two. In stage two, participants chose effort levels in the order determined in stage one. To 
determine timing, each participant was given two poker chips with a "L" and a "F" marked on one 
side to indicate lead or foll ow. Each participant placed a chip face down on the table to indicate the 
order in which they preferred to move. When the favorite and the underdog chips were both on the 
table, they were turned over to reveal the timing order for stage two. If the result was two L's or 
two F's, both players would move simultaneously in the stage two. If the favorite's chip was an L 
and the underdog's chip was an F, the favorite would move first (lead) and the underdog would move 
second (follow) in stage two. If the favo rite's chip was an F and the underdog's chip was an L, the 
favorite would fo llow and the underdog would lead in the stage two. 
Stage two consisted of choos ing a row or a column from a payoff table which corresponded 
with a particular effort level. Treatment l used a fi ve-by-five payoff table and treatment 2 used a 
three-by-three table. Figure 6 of Appendix A is the Payoff Table for treatment I and Figure 7 of 
Appendix A is the Payoff Table for treatment 2. 
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3.2.2 Design Specifics: Treatment l 
To test timing, equilibrium values, and rem dissipation, we selected specific parameter values 
for the model presented in section 2.2 . The asymmetry index a. was chosen to be 2. the largest 
value fo r which the second order conditions would hold in the favorite leader subgame. The reward 
was chosen to be 1440 to provide whole number equilibrium values in all subgames. With these 
parameter values, the simultaneous move. underdog leader, and favorite leader subgarne equilibria 
reduce to : 
(x t ,xtl - [320 , 320] 
(20) 
(2 1) 
(22) 
From these five effort levels , we constructed the Payoff Table for treatment 1 (see Figure 6 
in Appendix A). Player A was the underdog and chose from rows Rl through RS. The favo rite was 
player Band chose from columns Cl through CS. Rows or columns 1-S corresponded to effort levels 
0, 180, 270, 320, and 720, respectively . A copy of the experimental instructions for the favorite and 
the underdog in treatment l are included in Appendix B. 
Each cell in the Payoff Table represented a underdog/favorite payoff combination fo r the 
effort levels chosen. The first number in each cell represents the underdog's payoff (player A) and 
the second number in each cell represents the favorite's payoff (player B) in tokens. For instance, 
if player A chose row R2 and player B chose column C2, player A would receive 700 tokens and 
player B would receive 11 80 tokens if that trial was chosen as binding at the end of the experiment 
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(see Figure 6 in Appendix A). Players received the value of the token payoff in the binding trial plus 
$3.00 fo r participating in the experiment. Tokens were worth $0.01 , so player A would have 
received $10.00 f(700 x $.0 1) + $3.00) and player B would receive $14.80 
[(1 180 x $.01) + $3.00]. The predicted equ il ibrium effo11 levels listed above correspond to th ree 
cells in the Payoff table. The predicted underdog leader subgame equilibrium is (R2, C3), 
corresponding to an underdog effort level of 180 and favorite effort level of 270. The favorite leader 
equilibrium is cell (R 1, C5) correspondi ng to underdog effort level 0 and favo rite effort level 720. 
The simultaneou move equilib rium is cell (R4, C4) corresponding to favorite and underdog effort 
levels of 320. 
Each payoff in the Payoff Table was derived from the selected parameter values and the 
specifo: logit probability fu nction discussed in section 2.2. To induce risk neutral behavior, the 
Payoff Table values are expected values or certainty equ ivalents . No actual lonery was conducted 
to determine the winner of the 1440 tokens. For example, the token val ue of 700 for player A 
corresponds to the expected value of a lottery for 1440 tokens if player A chooses effort level 180. 
player 8 chooses effort level J 80, a = 2, and each player has an initi al endowment of 400 token . 
The expected value of 700 is a risk neutral player's certainty equivalent . A risk neutral player would 
be indi fferent between receiving 700 tokens with certainty or playing the lottery. The token value 
of 700 is computed as follows 
( 2 ( 18 ~ )8 0+ 18 0 ) 14 4 o - 18 o + 4 o o - 7 o o 
(23) 
Including an initial endowment amount in th e Payoff Table does not change the results. It simply 
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ensures that there are no negative payoffs that participants might avoid. 
Usi ng this experimental des ign we test seven hypotheses. The first two hypotheses concern 
the timing selected : 
Underdog Timing Hy pothesis: The underdog will choose to lead . 
Fa,•orite Timing Hypothesis: The favorite will choose to follow. 
Choos ing the predicted timing max imizes ex pected returns fo r the favorite and the underdog. We 
can also test whether participants perfo rm as predicted given their timing cho ice. To analyze non-
timing or effort performance we must look at actual verses predicted leader effort levels , fo llower 
effort levels, effort levels when moving simultaneously, and total effort o r rent dissipation. The 
effort hypotheses are: 
Underdog Leader H ypothesis: If the underdog leads he or she will select the predicted effort level 
of 180. 
Favorite Leader Hypothesis: If the favorite leads he or she will select the predicted effort level 720. 
Best Response Hypothesis: The follower will select the best response. The best response is the 
effort level that maximized his or her expected returns given the opponent's effort level. 
Simultaneous Move H ypothesis: If th e s imultaneous move Nash subgame is played , favor ites and 
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underdogs will select effort level 320. 
Rent Dissi pation Hypothesis: The total rent dissipation will be 32 .5 percent (( 180 + 270)/1440). 
The Favorite Leader and the Simultaneous Move Hypotheses are constructed for the 
poss ibil ity that participants do not select the theoreticall y predicted timing. It could be the case that 
participants select the predicted subgame equilibrium even though they do not select the predicted 
timing. If this is the case, the Favorite Leader and the Simultaneous Move Hypotheses can reveal 
whether the subgame equilibrium in question is attained . Endogenous timing is predicted to improve 
efficiency by dissipating a smaller percentage of rent compared to the simultaneous move Nash 
equilibrium. The Rent Dissipation Hypothesis will determine if the predicted rent dissipation is 
observed . 
3.2.3 Results: Treatment 1 
The average percent each player chose the predicted timing was analyzed to test the timing 
hypotheses. If the average percent the underdogs chose to lead is statistically different from 100 
percent we will reject the Underdog Timing Hypothesis . Similarly, if the average percent the 
favorites chose to follow is statistically different from 100 percent we will reject Favorite Timing 
Hypothesis. Figure 8 (Appendix A) shows the frequ ency underdogs chose to lead in trials 1-20. 
Figure 9 (Appendix A) shows the frequency underdogs chose to lead in trials 16-20. The frequency 
distributions were computed by determining the average percent each participant chose the predicted 
timing and then grouping into intervals. The purpose of a repeated trial des ign is to al low for 
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repeated market exposure and al lo w convergence to a equ ii ibrium value . For this reason 
experimenters often examine the last several trials to look fo r convergence to an equilibrium. The 
graphs do not reveal a convergence to the predicted timing for the underdogs. The average percent 
underdogs chose to lead in trials 1-20 was 35 .26 percent while the average percent the underdogs 
chose to lead in the last five trials was only 27 .37 percent. We reject the Underdog Timing 
Hypothesis . 8 
On average, the favorites selected th e predicted timing more than the underdogs. Figure I 0 
and 11 (Appendix A) show the frequency favo rites chose to fo llow in trials 1-20 and trials 16-20 . 
Favorites chose to fol low an average of 55.0 percent in trials 1-20 and 55 .79 percent in trials 16-20 . 
Even though favorites did appear to choose the predicted timing on average more frequently than 
underdogs, we rej ect the Favorite Timing Hypothesis. 
To test the Underdog Leader Hypothes is, we computed the average underdog effort level 
when leading for each trial. We would 1 ike to assume that each of the twenty trials are independent 
for ease o f statistical testing. To support this assumption , we tested for first and second degree serial 
correlation . We estimated first and second -order autocorrelation models using Cochrane-Orcutt9 type 
procedure. The bas ic model was 
(24) 
where Y, is effort level in trial t fort = 1, ... ,20 . First-order autocorrelation models incorporated 
(25) 
and seco nd-ord er autocorrelation models incorporated 
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(26) 
where vl is independently and identically distributed with a mean of zero. Similar procedures were 
used in subsequent hypothesis tests involvi ng effort levels. For ensuing tests, t remained the 
independent variable and the appropriate dependent variable was used for each model. We failed to 
reject the hypotheses that p 1 and p2 are equal to zero at the 95 percent significance level, supporting 
the assumption of independent trials. The underdog's average effort level when leading was 257 . 16 
compared to a predicted effort level of 180. No significant trend was found in the effort level . With 
95 percent confidence we reject the Underdog Leader Hypothesis and conclude that underdogs exerted 
more effort on average than predicted by endogenous timing theory. 
The Favorite Leader Hypothesis was tested in a similar manner to the Underdog Leader 
Hypothes is. But, we found first degree autocorrelation for favorite average effort level when leading 
between trials. Rho was found to be significant at the 95 percent significance level using a Cochrane-
Orcutt type procedure. Rho was estimated at .47 with a standard error of . 197. We did not find a 
significant trend in the favorite leader effort level. Since autocorrelation was fo und we used the 
quare root of the mean square error from the first-order autocorrelation model as the sample 
standard deviation. With 95 percent confidence we reject the Favorite Leader Hypothesis. The 
favorite average effort level was only 365 .29 compared to the predicted level of 720. 
The Best Response Hypothesis was tested separate! y for favo rites and underdogs. The 
average percent each player chose the best response when following was computed for all twenty 
trials. The favori te selected the best response an average of 67 . 88 percent of the time while the 
underdogs chose the best response an average of 68 .92 percent of the time. Because of the relatively 
straight forward task of picking the be t response from onl y five possible responses we looked at al l 
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twenty trials rather than only later tri als. There were also some players who did not follow in the 
last fi ve trials. making analysis of only the last five trials with respect to best response impossible. 
We find that the favorite's average percent of best responses is statistically less than 100 percent. 
We also find the underdog's average percent of best responses less than 100 percent. We reject the 
Best Response Hypothesis for the favorite and the underdog. But, we do not find the nearl y 70 
percent best response rate for all twenty trials entirely unreasonable since early trials and practice 
trials are included in this statisti c. 10 
The Simultaneous Move Hypothesis was tested separately for favorites and underdogs. 
Average effo rt per trial was computed fo r favo rites and underdogs. Again we assume that each trial 
is independent and support this assumption by failing to reject the hypothesis of no first or second 
order autocorrelation between trials fo r favorite or underdog effort levels when moving 
simultaneously. 11 No significant trend in average effort levels was found fo r favorites or underdogs. 
We reject the simultaneous move proposition for the favorite and the underdog at the 95 percent 
s ignificance level. The favorite 's average effort when moving simultaneously was 294.88 and the 
underdog's average effort when moving simultaneously was 281.67. Favorites and underdogs exerted 
less effort than predicted in the simultaneous move subgame. 
To test the Rent Dissipation Hypothesis, average dissipation was computed per trial. We 
again assume that each of the twenty trials are independent. To support this assumption, we tested 
for first and second degree serial correlation by constructing first and second-order autocorrelation 
models with Cochrane-Orcutt type procedures. We fa iled to reject the hypotheses that p 1 and p2 are 
equal to zero at the 95 percent signi ficance level, supporting the assumption of independent trials. 
We did find a significant positive trend in the dissipation level over the twenty trials with an estimated 
coefficient of .396 and a standard error of . 10 1. The Rent Dissipation Hypothesis is rejected at the 
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95 percent significance level. Participants diss ipated more than the predicted level of 31.25 percent 
and dissipated more each trial. 
In terms is social welfare. the result is worse than predicted because players exert more effort 
to capture a fi xed prize than predicted . But relative to the trad itional simultaneous move equilibrium, 
social welfare is improved . The predicted dissipation in the simultaneous move equilibrium is 44.4 
percent ([320 + 320J I 1440) which is statistically larger than the actual average dissipation of 39 .92 
percent. Even though players did not achieve the dissipation predicted by endogenous timing theory , 
on average, they dissipated less than the simultaneous move Nash subgame improving overall 
efficiency. Figure 12 (Appendix A) illustrates the average dissipation, predicted underdog leader 
diss ipation, predicted favorite leader dissipation, and predicted simultaneous move Nash dissipation 
by trial for all twenty trials. Table 1 contains descriptive statistics for the results in treatment I . 
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Table l: Treatment I Summary 
MEAN 
TIMING HYPOTHESES 
UNDERDOG TIMINGP 35 % 
FAVORITE TIMINGP 55 % 
EFFORT HYPOTHESES 
UNDERDOG LEADT 257 
FAVORITE LEADT 365 
UNDERDOG BEST RESPONSE 69% 
FA VO RITE BEST RESPONSE 68% 
UNDERDOG SIM ULTANEO UST 282 
FAVORITE SIMULTANEOUST 295 
RENT DISSIPATION 40% 
T - indicates results are in terms of tokens. 
P - listed as a percentage of actions predicted by theory. 
* - c. i. represent confidence interval . 
All data is computed fo r trials 1-20. 
95% c.i." PREDICTED 
28% 42 % 100% 
43 % 67 % 100% 
235 279 180 
324 407 720 
59% 78% 100 % 
53 % 83% 100% 
261 310 320 
272 317 320 
38% 42% 31% 
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3.2.4 Design Specifics: Treatment 2 
Treatment 2 was des igned to retest the timing and best response hypotheses with more robust 
incentives and a simpler game structure. Twenty-six undergraduate economics and sociology students 
participated in treatment 2. The des ign is identical to treatment l except the Payoff Table for 
treatment 2 (Figure 7 in Appendix A) is a 3 by 3 and the payoffs were not generated from a specific 
functional form. The Payoff Table for treatment 2 was designed in order to have a higher 
opportunity cost for deviations from optimal responses and to make the experiment easier to 
understand . The 3 by 3 design is more manageab le than the 5 by 5 Payoff Table used in treatment I. 
Also, cell s are in terms of whole dollars, making the payoff differences between competing cells 
larger. A copy of the experimental instructions fo r the favorite and the underdog for treatment 2 are 
contained in Appendix B. 
3.2.5 Results: Treatment 2 
As in Treatment 1, the average percent each player chose the predicted timing was analyzed 
to determine if the Underdog Timing and Favorite Timing Hypotheses could be rejected. The 
average percent the underdogs chose to lead in treatment 2 fo r all twenty trials was 58.46 percent, 
an improvement over the 35 .26 percent the underdogs chose to lead in treatment l. Favorites 
improved in a similar fashion, increasing the percent they chose to follow from 55 percent in 
treatment 1 to 76.54 percent in treatment 2. The increases in choosing predicted timing is not enough 
to support the Underdog Timing or the Favorite Timing Hypotheses. The tests were conducted in 
the same manner as treatment I . For the Underdog Timing Hypothes is the null hypothesis is that 
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the average percent the underdogs led will not be statistically di fferent from 100 percent. Likewise 
the null hypothes is fo r Favorite Timing Hypothes is is that the average percent the favorite fo llows 
is not statisticall y different from 100 percent. The Underdog Timing and the Favorite Timing 
Hypotheses are rejected at the 95 percent significance level. Figure 13 (Appendix A) shows the 
frequency underdogs chose to lead in treatment 2 fo r trials 1-20. Figure 14 (Appendix A) shows the 
frequency the underdogs chose to lead in trials 16-20. The average percent underdogs chose to lead 
in trial s 16-20 was 53.85 percent, a small decrease relative to the overall average percent of 58.46. 
Figure 15 and 16 (Appendix A) show the frequency the favo rites chose to follow in treatment 2 for 
trial s 1-20 and 16-20. The favo rites chose to fo llow 76.54 percent in trials 1-20 and 83.08 percent 
in trials 16-20. Both overall underdog and favorite timing averages are higher than treatment 1, but 
neither is high enough to keep us from rej ecting the null hypotheses at the 95 percent confidence 
level. 
As in treatment 1, the average percent each player chose the best response when fo llowing 
was computed for all twenty trials to test the Best Response Hypothesis . Favorite and underdogs 
selected the best response more frequently in treatment 2. Favorites selected the best response an 
average of 86.07 percent of the time, while underdogs chose the best response an average of 90.00 
percent of the time. At the 95 percent significance level, the favo rite's and underdog's average 
percent of best responses is statistically less than 100 percent. But, the upper bounds on the 
confidence intervals for the favorite and underdog are close to 100 percent at 96 and 99 percent. 
Table 2 summarizes the results from treatment 2. 
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Table 2: Treatment 2 Summary 
MEAN 95 3 c. i.' PREDICTED 
TIMING HYPOTHESES 
UNDERDOG TIMING 58 3 41 3 75 3 1003 
FAVORJTE TIMING 77 3 663 87 3 1003 
EFFORT HYPOTHESES 
UNDERDOG BEST RESPONSE 90 3 763 99 3 1003 
FAVORITE BEST RESPONSE 863 763 96 3 1003 
All results from treatment 2 are listed as a percentage of actions predicted by th eo ry . 
* - c. i. represent confidence interval. 
All data is computed from trials 1-20. 
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4. ANALYSIS 
Experimental resul.ts do not support Baik and Shogren 's endogenous timing theory. The 
Favorite Timing, Underdog Timing, Favorite Leader, Underdog Leader, Best Response, 
Simultaneous Move, and Rent Dissipation Hypotheses were all rejected at the 95 percent significance 
level for treatment 1. In treatment 2 we saw a higher percentage of participants choosing the 
predicted timing and best responses. There was not enough improvement to keep us from rejecting 
the Favorite Timing Hypothesis, Underdog Timing Hypothesis, Favorite Best Response, or Underdog 
Best Response Hypotheses. In treatment l we observed underdog choosing to lead less than half of 
the time and favorite choosing to follow only slightly more than half of the time. When the 
underdogs led on average, they exerted more effort than predicted while favorites exerted much less 
effort than pred icted while leading. When moving simultaneously, both player types exerted less 
effort than predicted. Average diss ipation was higher than predicted by endogenous timing but lower 
than the traditional simultaneous move Nash equil ibrium. The best response percentage was around 
70 percent fo r both player types in treatment l , although it did improve significantly in treatment 2 
to around 90 percent. 
In an attempt to interpret the observed behav ior, consider three poss ible explanations . First, 
a poss ible explanation is provided by Harrison (1989) concerning the opportunity costs of choosing 
the best response. Second, there is the possibility that equitable split behavior, observed in previous 
experiments, played a role. Third, if underdogs placed more value on the reward than the favorites, 
effort levels and timing preferences would change for both player types. 
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4.1 Harri on's Theory of Misbehavior 
In "Theory and Misbehavior of First-Price Auctions" (Harrison 1989) Harrison reconsidered 
experimental ev idence that appeared to reject Nash equilibrium models of bidding behavior in First-
Price auctions . Instead of looking at participant divergence from theoretical predictions in terms of 
bid deviations, Harrison looked at the behavior in terms of expected payoff space. Harr ison 
examined the forgone income fo r any given bid. When the actual bid and the predicted bid are the 
same the forgone income is zero. Harrison argues that when the forgo ne income or opportunity costs 
for not choosing the optimal bid is very small. participants cannot be expected to choose the optimal 
bid. The question then becomes how to define a "small" opportunity cost. Harrison concludes that 
foregone income must be greater than or equal to $0.03 before data can lead to the rejection of a 
theory . 1 ~ 
Although the test of endogenous timing theory differs from the analysis of bidding behavior 
in first price auctions, we can use Harrison's insight to evaluate possible participant responses in 
terms of forgo ne income or opportunity cost. First, we look at the opportunity costs for not choosing 
the best response in treatment l. Given a row or column choice by a leader, the follower has five 
possible responses. For the best response, th~ opportun ity cost is zero. Figure 17 (Appendix A) 
graphically illustrates the opportunity cost for best response deviations for the underdog in treatment 
1. BRI through BR5 represent the first through fifth best response. For example, if when lead ing 
the favo rite chose column 4 from the Payoff Table in treatment 1 (Figure 6 in Appendix A), the 
underdog's first best response would be row R4 and second best response would be row R3. In this 
case. the opportunity cost of choosing the second best response instead of the first best response is 
only $0.03 . Figure 18 (Appendix A) illustrates the opportunity costs fo r best response deviations for 
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the favorite in treatment I when the underdog leads. 
Clearly, given a number of leader effort levels, fo llower opportunity cost for deviating fro m 
the best response is small in treatment 1. Treatment 2 was designed to correct for this potential 
problem. Figure 19 and 20 (Appendix A) illustrate the opportunity cost fo r best response deviations 
in treatment 2. The smallest cost fo r choosing a bid other than the best response in treatment 2 was 
$1.00, significantly above the $0.03 threshold established by Harrison. 
Timing and best response choices in treatment 2 fo llow the theoretical predictions more 
closely than in treatment 1. But, not closely enough to accept Harrison's theory as the exclusive 
explanation of parti cipant perfo rmance. The average percent that favo rites and underdogs chose the 
predicted timing in treatment 2 was not high enough to support the Underdog Timing Hypothesis or 
the Favorite Timing Hypothes is even with the increased opportunity costs and the simpler Payoff 
Table. If the lack of proper opportunity costs was the only cause of deviations from th eory in 
treatment I, we would expect to fa il to reject all fo ur hypotheses in treatment 2. 
4.2 Equitable Split Behavior 
A number of economic experiments have documented ind ividuals acting more equitable than 
predicted by economic theory. One of the key assumptions of economics is that individuals are 
rational and self interested rather than fair and altruistic. Experiments on Coasian bargaining [see 
Shogren (1992)1 and on ultimatum games [see Roth (1988) and Thaler (1988)] have found that this 
is not necessarily the case. Shogren ( 1992) found that in an experiment on Coasian bargaining with 
uncertain payoff streams, 85 percent of agreements resulted in splitting the reward equally rather than 
the mutuall y advantageous splits predicted by theo ry. Roth (1988) reviews tests of several versions 
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of the Ultimatum Game where the modal offer was a fifty percent spl it of the prize. 13 
The fact that when the favorites led they only chose an average effort level of 365.29 in 
treatment 1 rather than the predicted level of 720 can be considered evidence of equitable split 
behavior. By choosing less than the payoff maximizing effort level the favorite forfeited some 
potential returns and allowed the underdog the opportunity to increase his or her returns. This is 
illustrated in Figures 21 and 22 (Appendix A). Figure 2 l shows the favorite and underdog's average 
payoff per trial as a percent of the equilibri um predicted by endogenous timing theory in treatment 
I. If both the favorite and the underdog were entirely self interested, both wou ld receive 100 percent 
of their predicted payoff: 1210 for the favorite and 580 for the underdog. Instead , the favorite 
average payoff was 91 percent and the underdogs average payoff was 103 percent of the predicted 
payoff fo r twenty trials in treatment I. Figure 22 shows the favori te and underdog's average payoff 
per trial as a percentage of predicted payoff in treatment 2. In treatment 2 neither the favorites or 
the underdogs captu red 100 percent of their predicted returns, but the underdogs did capture a higher 
percentage of the expected returns th an Lhe favorites. Underdogs average 91 percent of predicted 
returns while favorites averaged 84 percent of predicted returns in treatment 2. 
If equitab le split behavior is the player objective, we would expect the modal cell choice to 
minimize the difference between favorite and underdog payoffs. In treatment I , the five cells with 
the smallest difference between payoffs (see Figure 6 in Appendix A) in order of increasing 
difference are: (Rl , C l ); (RS, C2); (R4, C2); (RS , C3); and (R3, C2). The payoff difference fo r 
these fi ve cells are: 0, 60, 224, 244, and 296. None of the five cells are the modal response fo r 
treatment I . The modal response was (R4. C4) which has a payoff difference of 480. The second 
most frequentl y observed outcome was cell (R4. C3) which has a payoff difference of 418. In 
treatment 2, the modal response was cell (R2 , Cl ) which has a payoff difference of $3 .00. The 
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second most frequeml y observed outcome in treatment 2 was cell (R3, C2), which was the cell with 
the minimum payoff difference of $1.00. These results provide only weak support for equitable 
splitting behavior. If equitable splitting was th e objective, we would expect the frequency of 
observed equ itable splitting to be similar to that in previous experiments [see Shogren (1992), Roth 
(1988), and Thaler (1988)], which is not the case. 1~ 
4.3 Asymmetric Gain Valuation 
A third explanation of observed behavior lies in the concept of asymmetric gain valuation. 
It is conceivable that the underdogs place a higher value on the gain than the favorites. Sporting 
events provide examples of disadvantaged teams or players who try harder than predicted. A team 
with an injured star player will often raise their effort level to compensate fo r the loss. Often teams 
not predicted to excel in playoffs will exceed popular expectations. Placing a team or a player at a 
disadvantage may inspire increased effort . The theory is epitomized by the Biblical confl ict between 
David and Goliath . The weaker contender places much more value on the victory than the stronger 
contender, inducing greater effort by the weaker party. This can be modeled by assuming the 
underdog places more value on the gain than the favori te, which wi ll be referred to as asymmetric 
gain valuation. 
In this model, a player has more influence over the probability function, while the other 
player places more value on th e gain. For s implicity, designate the player with the greatest influence 
over the probabi lity function as the favo rite, even though in this contest the favorite may not have 
a greater than fift y percent chance of winning at the Nash equilibrium . Designate the underdog as 
the player with less influence over the probability of winning. In this model, the favorite's objective 
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function is unchanged from Baik and Shogren's (l992b) model of endogenous timing . The favo rite 
maximizes expected returns 
ax1 __ ____:::__ G - X 1 . 
ax1 + x2 (27) 
The underdog maximizes expected returns with greater value placed on the gain denoted by o > 1. 
The underdog's objective functio n is 
Max 1t 2 -
Xz 
(28) 
Using methods analogous to those used in section 2 .2 we derive the simultaneous move Nash 
equilibrium, the favorite leader equilibrium, and the underdog leader equilibrium: 
1 I 2 J.:. 2 I 
(xN X N) - [ a.o G 
( u + a ) 
( X FL X FL) _ [ a G 1 I 2 4 0 I 
<XG (2 0 -<X ) ]' 
4 0 
( X UL X UL) -[ 0 G ( 2 <X - 0 ) 
1 I 2 2 4 a 
, o2c]. 
4 (X 
Appendix C contains a complete derivation of the three subgame equilibria . 
(29) 
(30) 
(31) 
Figures 23 and 24 (Appendix A) show the favorite and underdog's expected returns for 
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different gain valuations, o. The gain and CJ. parameter values are identical to those used in treatment 
I . The gain value is 1440 and CJ. = 2. Figures 23 and 24 ill ustrate that the favorite and the underdog 
prefer the underdog leads subgame fo r o < 2. But. when o > 2 th e underdog prefers to play the 
favorite leads subgame. The favorite also prefers the favorite leads subgame, but the preference fo r 
the favorite leads subgame over the simultaneous move subgame is very small . This is because 
favorite expected returns in the favo rite leads subgame are only slightly higher than the simultaneous 
move subgame. For both players, the critical value for o is two. At o = 2, neither player has a 
timing preference. In this case. the favorite's greater influence over the probability of winning is 
perfectly offset by the underdog's greater gain valuation. 
Figures 25 and 26 (Appendix A) show how player effort level vary with different gain 
valuations. Figure 25 illustrates that the favorite effort level decreases in the favorite leads subgame 
with any gain valuat ion asymmetry. Conversely, Figure 26 shows that the underdog effort level 
increases in all sub games when the valuation asymmetry is greater than unity. Notice that when 
o = 2. the underdog's effort level is twice the favorite 's effo rt level. In this case each player has 
a fifty percent chance of winning the reward. The favorite is twice as productive at influencing the 
probability of winning but the underdog tries two times as hard . If o > 2, the underdog exerts 
enough effort to make his or her chance of winning more than fifty percent, favorites and underdogs 
trade roles. Figure 27 (Appendix A) shows how total effort increases with increases in the valuation 
asymmetry , leading to greater social cost from the larger amount of rent dissipated in all subgames. 
In this context , valuing a reward at more th an its monetary worth if inefficient fo r society. 
From Figures 23-27 (Appendix A) and th e subgame equilibrium levels derived in this section, 
let us examine four propos itions which will be fulfilled if asymmetric gain valuation ex ists 
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Proposition 1: A significant number of underdogs will chose to follow. 
Proposition 2: When leading, the favo rite's effort level will be lower than predicted by endogenous 
timing without asymmetric gain valuation. 
Proposition 3: When leading, the underdog's effort level will be higher than predicted by 
endogenous timing without asymmetric gain valuation. 
Proposition 4: Rent dissipation will be higher than predicted by endogenous timing without 
asymmetric gain valuat ion. 
Proposition I assumes that the underdog's gain valuation is at least two times higher than the 
favorite's valuation. If the ga in asymmetry was less than two we would still expect the underdogs 
to lead rather than follow. Since the difference between favorite expected returns in the favorite leads 
subgame and the simultaneous move subgame is trivial , a prediction for favorite timing choice wi ll 
not be tested. Propositions 2, 3, and 4 will be fulfilled even if the gain valuation is less than two, 
as depicted by Figures 25, 26, and 27 (Appendix A). 
To examine the four propositions, we wil l use the results from all twenty trials of treatment l . 
Treatment 2 resu lts will not be used since there are no explicit effort levels associated with them. 
Using 95 percent confidence intervals associated with the resu lts in section 3.2.3, all four asymmetric 
gain valuation propositions are supported . For proposition I the average percent each underdog 
chose to lead was 35, with a 95 percent confidence interval of (28 , 42). Conversely , the average 
percent underdogs chose to fo ll ow was 65 with a similar confidence interval. The large frequency 
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that the underdogs chose to fo llow supports proposition l . With respect to propos ition 2, the 
favorite's average effort level when leading was 365 relative to the predicted level of 720. The 95 
percent confidence interval of (324, 407) lead to the strong support of propos ition 2, favorites did 
exert less effort when lead ing. For proposition 3. the underdog's average effort level when lead ing 
was 257 compared to the predicted level of 180. The 95 percent confidence interval fo r underdog 
effort level when leading is (235, 279) supporting proposition 3, underdogs did exert more effort 
when leading . The average rate of dissipation per trial of 40 percent and 95 percent confidence 
interval of (38, 42) also support proposition 4. The observed dissipation rate of 40 percent was 
significantl y higher than the predicted rate of 31 percent. 
Support fo r asymmetric gain valuation motivates questions concerning the value of o. The 
average percent that underdogs chose to fo llow of 65 percent in treatment I indicate that o may be 
greater than two. The favorite's average effort level when leading of 365 indicates an estimated o 
of l.97 . The underdog's average effort level when leading of 257 points to an estimated o of only 
1. 19. Clearl y, experimental evidence implies a gain asymmetry larger than one, but whether o is 
greater than two remains to be answered. 
Results from Shogren and Baik (l 992) experimental study of leader/follower behav ior also 
support asymmetri c gain valuation. Baik and Shogren tested leader/fo llower behavior analogous to 
the favo rite leader subgame from section 2.2 of this thesis. Baik and Shogren found that favorite 
leader effort level was signifi cantl y lower than predicted . They also found that underdogs tended to 
expend more effort than predicted by theory and the dissipation rate was greater than pred icted by 
theory (greater than the predicted Nash). All three of these findings support the pred ictions of 
asymmetric gain valuation. 
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S. CONCLUSION 
Baik and Shogren's (1992b) theory of endogenous timing finds little support in this 
experimental study. Harrison's theory of misbehav ior in first price auctions provide some insight into 
the results from treatment 1. Jn treatment 2 we saw a dramatic increase in the percentage of best 
responses. But. the simpler payoff tab le and opportunity costs designed co incorporate Harrison's 
theory did not bring results in line with theoretical predictions. The Underdog Timing and Favorite 
Timing Hypotheses were still rejected in treatment 2, as were the Favorite and Underdog Best 
Response Hypotheses. The concept of equitable splitting is another possible explanation for observed 
behavior. We did see underdogs capture a greater percentage of the predicted gains and favorites 
capture a smaller percentage of the predicted gains in both treatments. But, we did not find choices 
centering on cell s with the most equitable splits. Asymmetric gain valuation does explain much of 
the deviation from theoretical predictions, and provides testable propositions relati ve to endogenous 
timing theory. Common fol klore pred icts that underdogs try harder in conflicts, asymmetric gain 
valuation supports this belief. Understanding the dynamics of the conflict between large and small 
can provide insight into a large number of economic environments. Future experiments should be 
designed to clearly test between the competing th eories . An experiment incorporating robust 
incentives, testing between equitable plitting and asymmetric gain valuation is the obvious next step. 
Another important and possibly more difficul t question to answer is how risk avers ion would change 
the results . 
An importanr point to remember is that even though results did fail to support the original 
theory, th is should not be interpreted as failure of experimental economics. Results counter to 
accepted theories illustrate the importance of experimental tests. To paraphrase Einstein, theory 
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should owe its invention entirely to th e desire to make phys ical theory tit observed fact as well as 
poss ibl e [Albert Einstein (from Smith 1989)). 
I . Tullock (1980), p.97. 
2. Plott (1991), p.905. 
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ENDNOTES 
3. Jn this example. fees spent on attorneys are considered a directly unproductive activ ity. 
4. Baik and Shogren (1992b) explain that the underdog would prefer to bluff the favo rite by stating 
that he or she will move first, but then waiting until the favo rite moves before he or she actually 
expends effort . Irreversible and observable effort levels prevent this outcome. 
5. Plott (1991), p. 905. 
6. Roth (1988), p.629. 
7. Participants were seated in the order that th ey arrived at the experimental session. Monitors did 
attempt to keep participants that knew each other from sitting in close prox imity. 
8. The Underdog Timing and Favorite Timing Hypotheses were conducted assuming that participant's 
timing choices are independent and distributed according to a truncated normal distribution, where 
the truncation points are zero and one. In each case, simulation procedures (with 10,000 random 
drawings) were used to construct both the truncated distribution and the 95 percent confidence 
interval. based on the observed sample mean and standard deviation of that mean. Ensuing 
hypotheses tests involving timing or best responses were conducted in a similar fashion for treatment 
I and treatment 2. 
9. See Pindyck and Rubinfeld (1991) fo r discuss ion of Cochrane-Orcutt procedures. 
10. Shogren and Baik (1992) found that 74 percent of underdogs in one group selected the be: t 
response in a Stackelberg favorite leader framework . In another test group. 61 percent of underdog 
effort level exceed the best response. Direct comparison to the current experiment is difficult ince 
the Shogren and Baik experiment used a twenty-four by twenty-four "expected" payoff table 
compared to the current five by five payoff table. Additionally, Shogren and Baik analyzed I.he 
degree of over expend itu re rather than the percent each individual selected the best response. 
11. This was performed with a Cochrane-Orcutt type procedure as in the underdog leader hypothes is. 
12. See Harrison ( 1989), p. 760. 
13. See Thaler ( 1988) fo r a complete description of the Ultimarum Game. 
14. In treatment 2. participants were asked a series of questions (see Appendix B) after completing 
the practi ce rounds . Approximately 75 percent of answers indicated I.hat the participant would make 
42 
a choice in o rder to get higher payoffs. No participants indicated that they were attempting to 
minimize the difference between favorite and underdog payoffs . 
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PLAYER B 
C1 C2 C3 C4 cs 
R1 400,400 400, 1660 400, 1570 400, 1520 400, 1120 
p 
L R2 1660, 400 700,1180 580, 1210 536, 1204 380, 960 
A 
y 
E R3 1570, 400 747, 1043 610, 1090 557, 1093 357, 893 
R 
A R4 
1520, 400 758, 982 616, 1034 560, 1040 342,858 
RS 1120, 400 640, 700 503, 747 442, 758 160, 640 
: 
Figure 6. Payoff table for treatment l . 
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PLAYER B 
C1 C2 C3 
6, 14 6, 13 6,10 
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10,8 8,9 4,6 
Figure 7. Payoff table fo r treatment 2. 
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Consent Form 
You are about to participate in an experiment in endogenous timing. The 
purpose is to gain insight into how you choose timing in an economic setting . 
The experiment will take roughly one hour and t h irty minutes. Resu lts from 
the exper iment will be used in a thesis and /o r dissertation. 
We need your signed consent if you are to act as a subject . Your 
participation in the e xperiment is completely voluntary and you may withdraw 
from the e xperiment at any time without prejudice to you . Results from the 
experiment will be strictly confident ial. Any name associated with the 
experiment will be deleted upon completion of the experiment. 
If you consent to participate in the experiment, please s ign the consent form 
below. 
I have read the consent form statement and agree to act as a subject in the 
experiment, with the understanding that I can withdraw from the experiment at 
any time without p re judice to me. 
I I 
Signature Date 
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Treatment 1 Underdog I nstr u c t i ons 
You are about to participate in an experiment about decision making. 
The pur po se of this experiment is to gain insight into certain featur es of 
e conomic processes. If you follow the instructions carefully you can earn 
mone y. You will find it helpful to refer t o the Payoff Table and Individual 
Record Sheet on the back of the handout as you read these instructions . 
The experiment proceeds as fo llows : 
1. PLAYER OBJ ECTIVE : You and you r opponent will independently make 
decisions that will determine how many tokens you receive at the 
end o f the experiment. Each t oken is wor th one cent 
( 1 token= $0 . 01). 
2 . PAYOFF TABLE: You (P l ayer A) will choose from rows Rl t hrough 
RS . Yo ur opponent (Player B) wi l l choose fr om columns Cl through 
cs. The Payoff Table shows the amount o f tokens you will receive 
given the r ow you se lect and the column your opponent selects. 
Your payoff is the first number in each cell . For example, if 
you select R2 and your opponent selects C2, then your payoff i s 
700 tokens. 
3 . TRIALS : The experiment consist of 20 trials . Trials 1 and 2 are 
for practice and will not affect your actual take- home - pay. 
Trials 3 - 20 are potentially b inding (could determine how much 
money you receive at the end of the exper i ment) . In each tria l 
there are two stages. In the first stage you and your opponent 
will choose to lead or follow . Th is determines the order o f play 
in the second stage. In the second stage you will select a row 
and you r opponent will select a column a ccording to o rder of play 
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determined in the first stage . 
Stage 1: 
YOUR 
Both you and your opponent will independently and 
simultaneously choose to lead or follow. If you 
choose to lead and your opponent chooses to follow, 
then in stage 2 you lead and your opponent follows. 
If you choose to foll ow and your opponent chooses to 
lead, then in stage 2 you r opponent will lead and 
you will follow. If you both choose to lead or if 
you both choose t o follow, you and your opponent 
will move simultaneously. The o rder of play in 
stage 2 is summarized below. 
YOUR 
OPPONENT ' S ORDER 
CHOICE CHOICE OF PLAY 
Lead Lead Simultaneous 
Follow Follow Simultaneous 
Lead Follow A Leads, 8 Follows 
Follow Lead B Leads, A Follows 
Stage 2: If you lead , you select a row and reveal it to your 
opponent . Your opponent will follow by choosing a 
column with the knowledge of your choice . If you 
follow, your opponent will select a column and 
reveal the choice to you. You will then select a 
row with the knowledge of your opponent's choice . 
If you and your opponent move simultaneously, you 
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select a row, your opponent selects a column, and 
you both reveal your choice to each other at the 
same time. 
4. RECORDING TRIALS: On your Individual Record Sheet you will 
r ecord your opponent' s identification number , Player A and B's 
choice to lead or follow, the actual leader stage 2 , Player A and 
B's selected row or column , and your co r responding payoff. In 
the Actual Leader column enter an "S" if both players moved 
simultaneously. 
5. TAKE-HOME-PAY: The actual take-home-pay is determined as 
follows: after all 20 trials are completed, the Monitor will 
randomly select one of trials 3-20 to determine you r take- home-
pay . You will receive the value of the token payoff for that 
trial plus $3.00 for participating in the experiment. 
AN EXAMPLE: Assume trial 17 is selected to determine take-home-
pay. If in trial 17 you chose R2 and your opponent chose C2, 
your payoff is 700 tokens. 
receive is 
The actual dollar amount you will 
$10.00 - 700(tokens) x $0.01 + $3.00 
6. OPPONENTS: You will play against a different opponent e very 
trial. However , you will always be an "A Player" and your 
opponent will always be a "B Player". 
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QUESTIONS 
Player Identification number:~~~~~ 
Please circle the correct answer. 
1 . Your payoff is listed first or second in each cell? 
FIRST SECOND 
2 . What happens if you and your opponent both choose to follow? 
YOU FOLLOW YOU LEAD 
YOU AND YOUR OPPONENT MOVE SIMULTANEOUSLY 
3. If Player A chooses row R3 , and Player B chooses column CS , what 
is your payoff (remember you are Player A)? 
503 700 357 580 893 
4. Your take-home-pay will be determined based on each trial or 
based on one of trials 3- 20 chosen at random? 
EACH TRIAL ONE TRIAL 
DO YOU HAVE ANY QUESTIONS? 
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Treatment 1 Favorite Instructions 
You are about to part icipate in an experiment about decision making . 
The purpose of this exper iment is to gain insight into certain f eatures of 
economic processes. If you follow the instructions carefully you can earn 
money. You will find it helpful to refer to t he Payof f Table and Individual 
Record Sheet on the back o f the handout as you read these instructions . 
The experiment proceeds as f ollows : 
1 . PLAYER OBJECTIVE: You and your opponent will i ndependent ly make 
decisions that will determine how many tokens you receive at the 
end of the experiment. Each token is worth one cent 
(l token= $0 . 01) . 
2. PAYOFF TABLE : You (Player B) will choose fr om columns Cl t hrough 
CS. Your opponent (Player A) will choose from rows Rl through 
RS. The Payoff Table shows the amount of tokens you will receive 
given the column you select a nd the row your opponent selects . 
Your payoff i s the second number in each cell . For example , if 
you select C2 and your opponent se lects R2, then you r payoff i s 
1180 tokens. 
3. TRIALS : The experiment cons ist o f 20 trials. Tria l s 1 and 2 are 
for practice and will not affect you actual take-home- pay. 
Trials 3- 20 are potentially binding (cou ld determine how much 
money you receive at the end of the experiment) . In each trial 
there are two s tages. In the first stage you and your opponent 
will choose to lead or follow. This deter mines t he order o f play 
in the second stage . In the second stage you will select a 
column and you r opponent will select a row according t o o rder of 
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play determined in the first stage. 
stage 1: 
YOUR 
Both you and your opponent will independently and 
simultaneously choose to lead or follow. If you 
choose to lead and your opponent chooses to follow, 
then in stage 2 you lead and your opponent follows. 
If you choose to follow and your opponent chooses to 
lead, then in stage 2 your opponent will lead and 
you will follow. If you both choose to lead or if 
you both choose to follow, you and your opponent 
will move simultaneously. The order of play in 
stage 2 is summarized below. 
YOUR 
OPPONENT ' S ORDER 
CHOICE CHOICE OF PLAY 
Lead Lead Simultaneous 
Follow Follow Simultaneous 
Follow Lead A Leads, B Follows 
Lead 
Stage 2: 
Follow B Leads, A Follows 
If you lead, you select a column and reveal it to 
your opponent . Your opponent will fo llow by 
choosing a r ow with the knowledge of your choice. 
If you follow, your opponent will se l ect a row and 
reveal the choice to you. You will then select a 
column with the knowledge of your opponent's choice. 
If you and your opponent move simultaneously, you 
4. 
s . 
6. 
8 1 
select a column, your opponent selects a row, and 
you both reveal your choice to each other at the 
same time. 
RECORDING TRIALS : On your Individual Record Sheet you will 
record your opponent's identification number, Player A and B's 
choice to l ead or follow , the actual leader in stage 2, Player A 
and B's selected row or column, and your corre sponding payoff. 
In the Actual Leader column enter an "S'' if both players moved 
simultaneously. 
TAKE-HOME-PAY: The actual take-home-pay is determined a s 
follows: after all 20 trials are completed, the Monitor will 
randomly select one of trials 3-20 to determine your take- home-
pay . You will receive the value of the token payoff plus $3.00 
for participation in the experiment . 
AN EXAMPLE: Assume trial 17 is selected to determine take- home-
pay . If in trial 17 you chose C2 and your opponent chose R2, 
then your payoff is 1180 tokens. 
will receive is 
The actual dollar amount you 
$14.80 - ll80(tokens) x $0.01 + $3.00 
OPPONENTS : You will play against a different opponent every 
trial. However, you will always be a "B Player" and your 
opponent will always be an "A Player". 
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QUESTIONS 
Player Identification number:~~~~~ 
Please circle the correct answer. 
1. Your payoff is listed first or second in each cell? 
FIRST SECOND 
2. What happens if you and your opponent both choose to follow? 
YOU FOLLOW YOU LEAD 
YOU AND YOUR OPPONENT MOVE SIMULTANEOUSLY 
3. If Player A chooses row R3, and Player B chooses column CS, what 
is your payoff (remember you are Player BJ ? 
1180 747 893 357 1093 
4. Your take-home-pay will be determined based on each trial or 
based on one of trials 3- 20 chosen at random? 
EACH TRIAL ONE TRIAL 
DO YOU HAVE ANY QUESTIONS? 
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Treatment 1 Individual Record Sheet 
Player Identification number=~~~~~ 
0 
p 
p 
0 T 
N R Your 
E I Your Opponent's Actual Leader 
N A Choice Choice in Stage 2 (S= A's B's Your 
T L L or F L or F Simultaneous) Row Column Payoff 
1 L F L F 
2 L F L F 
3 L F L F 
4 L F L F 
5 L F L F 
6 L F L F 
7 L F L F 
8 L F L F 
9 L F L F 
10 L F L F 
11 L F L F 
12 L F L F 
13 L F L F 
14 L F L F 
15 L F L F 
16 L F L F 
17 L F L F 
18 L F L F 
19 L F L F 
20 L F L F 
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Treatme nt 2 Underdog Instructions 
You are about to participate in an experiment about decision making. 
The purpose of this experiment is to gain insight into certain features of 
economic processes. If you follow the instructions carefully you can earn 
money. You will find it helpful to refer to the Payoff Table and Individual 
Recor d Sheet on the back of the handout as you read these instructions . 
The experiment proceeds as follows: 
1. PLAYER OBJ ECTIVE: You and your opponent will independently make 
decisions that will determine how much money you receive at the 
end of the experiment. 
2 . PAYOFF TABLE : You (Player A) will choose from rows Rl through 
R3. Your opponent (Player B) will choose from columns Cl through 
C3. The Payoff Table shows the amount of money you will receive 
given the row you select and the column your opponent selects . 
Your payoff is the first number in each cell. For example, if 
you select R2 and your opponent selects C2, then your payoff is 
7 dollars . 
3. TRI ALS : The experiment consist of 20 trials. Trials 1 and 2 are 
for practice and will not affect your actua l take-home-pay. 
Trials 3 - 20 are potentially binding (could determine how much 
money you receive at the end o f the experiment) . In each trial 
there are two stages. In the first stage you and your opponent 
will choose to lead or follow. This determines the order of play 
in the second stage. In the second stage you will select a row 
and your opponent will select a column according to order of play 
determined in the first stage. 
Stage 1: 
YOUR 
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Both you and your opponen t will independently and 
simultaneously choose to lead o r follow . If you 
c hoose to lead and your opponent c hooses to f ollow , 
then in stage 2 you lead and your opponent follows. 
If you choose to follow and your opponent chooses to 
lead, then i n stage 2 your opponent will lead and 
you will follow . If you both choose to lead or if 
you both choose to follow, you and your opponent 
will move simultaneously. The o rder of play in 
stage 2 is summarized below . 
YOUR 
OPPONENT ' S ORDER 
CHOICE CHOICE OF PLAY 
Lead Lead Simultaneous 
Follow Follow Simultaneous 
Lead Follow A Leads , B Follows 
Follow Lead B Leads , A Follows 
Stage 2: If you lead , you select a row and reveal it to your 
opponent . Your opponent will follow by choosing a 
column with the knowledge o f you r choice. If you 
follow, your opponent will select a column and 
reveal the choice to you. You will then select a 
row with the knowledge of your opponent 's choice . 
If you and your opponent move simultaneously , you 
select a row, your opponent selects a column , and 
you both reveal your choice to each other at the 
4 . 
5. 
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same time. The Monitor will demonstrate how to 
reveal your choices. 
RECORDING TRIALS : On your Individual Record Sheet you will 
record your opponent's identification number, Player A and B's 
choice to lead or follow, the actual leader stage 2 , Player A and 
B's selected row or column, and your corresponding payoff. In 
the Actual Leader column enter an "S" if both players moved 
simultaneously . 
TAKE-HOME-PAY: The actual take-home-pay is determined as 
follows: after a ll 20 trials are completed, the Monitor will 
randomly select one of trials 3-20 to determine your take-home-
pay. You will receive the dollar value f or that trial. 
AN EXAMPLE: Assume trial 17 is selected to determine take-home-
pay. If in trial 17 you chose R2 and your opponent chose C2 , 
your payoff is 7 dollars. 
6. OPPONENTS : You will play against a different opponent every 
trial. However, you will always be an "A Player" and your 
opponent will always be a "8 Player". 
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QUESTIONS 
Player Identification number=~~~~~ 
Please circ l e the correct answer. 
1 . Your payoff is listed first or second in each cell? 
FIRST SECOND 
2. What happens if you and your opponent both choose to follow ? 
YOU FOLLOW YOU LEAD 
YOU AND YOUR OPPONENT MOVE SIMULTANEOUSLY 
3 . If Player A chooses r ow R2, and Player B chooses column CJ, what 
is you r payoff (remember you are Player A)? 
4 5 6 7 8 
4 . Your take-home-pay will be determined based on each trial or 
based on one of trials 3-20 chosen at random? 
EACH TRIAL ONE TRIAL 
DO YOU HAVE ANY QUESTIONS? 
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QUESTIONS 
Player Identificat ion number : ~~~~~-
Please answer the following questions (there are no inco rrect answers) 
1 . If you move simultaneously you would prefer to choose r ow 
Why? 
2. If you lead you would prefer to choose row 
Why ? 
3. If you r opponent leads he / she will prefer to choose column 
Why ? 
Your response will be 
4. Circle your preferenc e : 
LEAD FOLLOW MOVE SIMULTANEOUSLY 
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Treatment 2 Favorite Instructions 
You are about to participate in an experiment about decision making . 
The purpose of this experiment is to gain insight into certain features of 
economic processes. If you f ollow the instructions carefully you can earn 
money. You will find it he l pful to refer to the Payoff Table and Individual 
Record Sheet on the back of the handout as you read these instructions. 
The experiment proceeds as follows: 
1. PLAYER OBJECTIVE : You and you r opponent will independently make 
decisions that will determine how much mo ney you receive at the 
end of the experiment. 
2. PAYOFF TABLE: You (Player B) will choose from columns Cl through 
C3. Your opponen t (Pl a yer A) will choose from r ows Rl through 
R3. The Payoff Table shows the amount of money you will receive 
given the column you select and the r ow your opponent selects. 
Your payoff i s the second number i n each cell. Fo r example, if 
you s e lect C2 a nd you r opponent selects R2, then your payoff is 
11 dollars. 
3. TRIALS: The exper iment consist of 20 trials. Trials 1 and 2 are 
for practic e and will not affect you r actual take-home-pay. 
Trial s 3-20 are potentially binding (could determine how much 
money you receive at the end of t he experiment). In each t r ial 
there are two stages. In the first stage you and your opponent 
will choose to l ead or f ollow . This determines the o rder of play 
in the second stage . In the second stage you will select a 
c olumn a nd you r opponent will select a r ow according to o rder of 
play determined in the first stage. 
Stage 1: 
YOUR 
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Both you and your opponent will independently and 
simultaneously choose to lead or follow . If you 
choose to lea d a nd you r opponent chooses to f o llow, 
then in stage 2 you lead and your opponent follows. 
If you choose to follow and your opponent chooses to 
lead , then in stage 2 your opponent will lead and 
you will follow. If you both choose to lead o r if 
you both choose to follow , you and your opponent 
will move simultaneously. The order of pla y in 
stage 2 is summarized below. 
YOUR 
OPPONENT'S ORDER 
CHOI CE CHOICE OF PLAY 
Lead Lead Simultaneous 
Follow Follow Simultaneous 
Lead Follow 8 Leads , A Follows 
Follow Lead A Leads, 8 Follows 
Stage 2: If you lead, you select a column and reveal it to 
your opponent. Your opponent will follow by 
c hoosing a row with the knowledge of your choice. 
If you follow, your opponent will select a r ow and 
reveal the choice to you . You will then select a 
column with the knowledge of your opponent ' s choice. 
If yo u and your opponent move simultaneously , you 
select a column, your opponent selects a r ow , and 
you both reveal your choice to each other at the 
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same time . The Monitor will demonstrate how to 
reveal your choices. 
4 . RECORDING TRIALS: On your Individual Record Sheet you will 
record your opponent's identification number , Player A and B's 
choice to lead or follow, the actual leader stage 2 , Player A and 
B's selected row or column, and your corresponding payoff. In 
the Actual Leader column enter an "S" if both players moved 
simultaneously . 
5 . TAKE-HOME-PAY: The actual take- home-pay is determined as 
follows: after all 20 t rials are completed , the Monitor will 
randomly select one of trials 3-20 to dete rmine your take-home-
pay. You will receive the dollar value for that trial. 
AN EXAMPLE: Assume trial 17 is selected to determine take-home-
pay. If in trial 17 you chose C2 and your opponent chose R2, 
your payoff is 11 dollars. 
6. OPPONENTS: You will play against a different opponent every 
trial. However, you will always be a "B Player" and your 
opponent will always be an "A Player". 
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QUESTIONS 
Player Identification number:~~~~~ 
Please circle the correct answer. 
1. Your payoff is listed first or second in each cell? 
FIRST SECOND 
2. What happens if you and your opponent both choose to follow? 
YOU FOLLOW YOU LEAD 
YOU AND YOUR OPPONENT MOVE SIMULTANEOUSLY 
3. If Player A chooses row R2, and Player B chooses column C3, what 
is your payoff (remember you are Player B)? 
4 5 6 7 8 
4. Your take-home-pay will be determined based on each trial or 
based on one of trials 3-20 chosen at random? 
EACH TRIAL ONE TRIAL 
DO YOU HAVE ANY QUESTIONS ? 
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QUESTIONS 
Player Identification number : ~~~~~-
Please answer the following questions (there are no incorrect answers) 
1. If you move simultaneously you would prefer to choose column 
Why? 
2. If you lead you would prefer to choose column 
Why? 
3. If your opponent leads he/ she will prefer to choose r ow 
Why? 
Your response will be 
4. Circle your preference: 
LEAD FOLLOW MOVE SIMULTANEOUSLY 
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Treatment 2 Individual Record Sheet 
Player Identification number:~~~~~ 
0 
p 
p 
0 T 
N R Your 
E I You r Opponent's Actual Leader 
N A Choice Choice in Stage 2 (S= A's B's Your 
T L L or F L or F Simultaneous) Row Column Payoff 
1 L F L F 
2 L F L F 
3 L F L F 
4 L F L F 
5 L F L F 
6 L F L F 
7 L F L F 
8 L F L F 
9 L F L F 
10 L F L F 
11 L F L F 
12 L F L F 
13 L F L F 
14 L F L F 
15 L F L F 
16 L F L F 
17 L F L F 
18 L F L F 
19 L F L F 
20 L F L F 
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APPENDIX C: DERIVATION OF ASYMMETRIC GAIN EQUILIBRIA 
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As explained in the text, the favorite maximizes expected returns 
Max 1t 1 -
X1 
ax1 ----G-
ax1 + x 2 
(32) 
and the underdog maximizes expected returns with greater value placed on the gain denoted by o > 
1. The underdog's objective function is 
Max n 2 -
X z 
(33) 
Maximizing the favorite and underdog objective functions yield the following first-order conditions 
___ a_x_2 __ G - 1 - o 
( ax1 + X2)2 
and the following second-order sufficient conditions 
a2 n 2 cr. G l < 0 2 > 0 ax~ ( ax1 + x 2) 3 
a2 n 20G 2 < 0 for x1 > O, ax; ( a x 1 + x 2) 3 
(34) 
(35) 
(36) 
(37) 
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which are satisfied since expected returns 7r, are strictly concave in X; for i = 1,2 . Define R1(x:J and 
R2(x1) favorite and underdog reaction functions derived from the first-order conditions 
l 
R2 (x1 ) - ( ao Gx1 ) 
2 - a x 1 
The simultaneous move Nash equilibrium is given by 
X 1 I X 2 ) - I ( N N [ ao G 
( o + a ) 2 
for O < x 2 ~ a G 
oG for 0 < x 1 s: a 
a G 
(38) 
(39) 
(40) 
In the favo rite leads subgame. player I (the favorite) chooses x1 to maximize expected returns subject 
to the player 2's (the underdog) reaction function, R2(x1) 
Max 1t 1 -
x, 
ax1 ----G - x 1 ax1 + x 2 
1 
s. t. x 2 - R2 (x1 ) - ( ao Gx1 ) 
2 - a x1 , 
yielding the fo llowing first and second-order cond itions 
1 a G -a1t lFL ( ) 1 
axl - 2 oxl 2 - 1 - 0 
(41 ) 
(42) 
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- -J:.(_!!:Q_) i 
4 ox{ 
< 0. 
(43) 
Using the first-order condition, the Stackelberg equilibrium with the favorite leading is given by 
( FL FL) [ <X G X1 I X 2 - 40 I 
aG (2 o -a) ] 
40 . 
(44) 
To maintain a positive level of effort from the underdog in the favorite leads subgame 
requires a /o < 2 . 
In the underdog leads subgame, the underdog chooses lC,z to maximize expected returns subject 
to the favorite's reactio n function R1(x,) 
Max 1t 2 -
Xz 
(45) 
yielding the foll owing first and seco nd-order conditio ns 
a1t 2UL 
( ) 1 
o G -
ax2 
---- 2 -1-0 
2 <XX2 
(46) 
a21t 2UL 5( Gt - - - -- 2 < 0. 
ax; 4 axi 
(47) 
Using the first-ord er condition , the Stackelberg equilibrium with the underdog leading is 
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given by 
( UL UL> [ 0 G (2a - o ) X1 I X2 - ------
4 cc 2 I ~1• 4<X 
(48) 
To maintain a positive level of effort from the favorite in the underdog leads subgame requires 
Of ex < 2 . If o = 1, the result is the original endogenous timing game. 
